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A Story of Rights: From Word and Conceptualisation to 
Law and Cultural Narrative
Alan Durant
I. Introduction
While writing this article,1 I happened to see for the first time an art 
work which powerfully illustrates the challenge of understanding rights 
through their interaction with notions of narrative. The work was a ban-
ner-like watercolour-and-graphite freeze called Purification, created in 
2012 by the Cameroonian artist Barthélémy Toguo. Hanging in the Tate 
Modern gallery in London like a huge, rolled-out scroll, the painting is 
populated by human figures, their contorted, semi-abstract faces and bod-
ies surrounded by hand-written sentences from the articles of the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In an accompa-
nying note, Toguo explains that the piece was “born from my response to 
sufferings endured by various groups of people around the world (geno-
cides, slaughters, deportations, discriminations)”; he urges that “Man 
must regenerate his own culture. . . He must operate a purge over himself 
and purify [himself] from his crimes and horrors.” What excited my inter-
est particularly was that, while our gaze is drawn to rights verbally 
declared (by reference to one of the great achievements of international 
law), those verbal formulations are squeezed in, in uncomfortable hand-
written form, around visual imagery of suffering humanity. Image and 
word confront each other with contrasting accounts; and the viewer is left 
to ponder an unresolved counterpoint of the kind associated with modern-
ist narratives rather than traditional stories such as folk tales or realist fic-
tion, which typically organise material so as to present a coherent, if 
debatable viewpoint on their chosen topic. One inference from Toguo’s 
technique might be that there are contradictions between what we aspire 
to and what rights deliver in terms of human well-being. Or, picking up 
1 This is revised version of my presentation for a conference, entitled “Narrating 
Rights” (the English Language and Literature Association of Korea [ELLAK] 
conference, Seoul, December 2017).
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one of the artist’s themes elsewhere, that in a period of liberal globalisa-
tion there is a conflict between how rights appear to the developed and 
developing worlds. Alternatively, the painting might hint that “narrating 
rights” is only possible if we test our declared norms against personal 
responses to the plight of others.
My wish to acknowledge the last of these possibilities was in part 
prompted by the phrase “narrating rights” that the conference organisers 
invited speakers to address. How, I wondered, can the idea of narration be 
applied to something as abstract and intangible as rights? After all, the 
most frequent objects of the verb narrate, not only intuitively but as 
attested by frequency in a 2 billion word corpus of English, are story, tale 
and past, followed (with greater complexity) by hadith, journey, 
Holocaust and self. There are no instances at all of narrating rights either 
in the corpus I consulted or in the digitised publications in Google Books. 
Rather than being “narrated,” rights are protected, exercised, violated, 
enforced, granted, infringed or guaranteed; when they first appear they 
are declared, claimed or championed. The list of “things narrated” is var-
ied. But “narrating rights” involves a strikingly new collocation, creating 
a conceptual metaphor conveying the underlying proposition RIGHTS 
FORM A KIND OF NARRATIVE. Such figurative meaning, as with 
“narrating the city” and other uses, poses difficult questions if the approach 
is to do justice to the chosen topic.
In this article, I propose to step back from discussing particular works 
such as novels, plays, diaries, or films. Instead, I want to offer general 
comments that I hope may provide a reference point for others in consid-
ering the many literary works and films that spring to mind as being con-
cerned with rights. I begin with a brief reminder of some important fea-
tures of rights as generally understood. Then, in the essay’s central sec-
tions, I outline the complex history of the English word rights, charting 
how that word’s changing meanings convey different, sometimes contest-
ed conceptualisations embedded in rights thinking in different periods. 
Building on this account, I conclude with comments and queries in rela-
tion to the challenges involved in representing rights in literary, media 
and other forms. My overall approach—seeking to illuminate connections 
between rights as developed in law and rights as depicted in literature—
combines linguistic with literary concerns. It also reflects interdisciplin-
ary work concerned with the language of law. One general outcome, I 
hope, may be extra sensitivity to the interconnectedness of linguistic, lit-
erary and legal aspects of political and cultural topics.
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II. Rights Reminder: Some Background
Rights are defined, invoked, aspired to, and contested in many different 
social settings. They are embedded, formally or informally, in virtually all 
social relationships and formations; and they have been fought over and 
fought for throughout history. Rights as a normative social concept are 
studied in many different fields, including philosophy, sociology, anthro-
pology and history, as well as more visibly in economics, social policy, 
and law. Their appearance as a topic in literary and cultural studies, by 
contrast, is fairly new. Exactly what rights, or kind of rights, are in ques-
tion in this new domain is not always obvious; and there are inevitably 
risks in treating rights as if they are all alike. The following five points 
highlight some relevant considerations.
1.  Particular rights that have been formally recognised range across very 
many different fields: from a right to life and a right of asylum to a 
right to property (including rights in intellectual property), and from 
rights to health, privacy, freedom of expression, religion and develop-
ment through to rights in human sexuality and reproduction, the envi-
ronment and education, as well as—an effective restraint on unbridled 
rights enthusiasm—a right to bear arms. It is important to keep in 
mind that supporters or advocates of one kind of right, or of rights held 
in one set of circumstances, may be ardent opponents of other kinds.
2.  Within this wide range, rights are categorised as belonging to different 
groupings. In addition to customary rights (e.g. rights traditionally 
conferred by birth, social status, or national sovereignty), there are pri-
vate rights (governing transactions between parties), rights of individ-
uals against state interference in their lives, and rights (including eco-
nomic rights) conferred in order to achieve utilitarian policy objec-
tives. Rights importantly means but doesn’t always mean human 
rights. Recent classifications of rights, even within the more specific 
category of human rights, cluster them further, as for instance civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights. Overall, there is a con-
tested architecture of rights, with for instance no agreed, finite number 
of rights even of those considered to be “fundamental.”
3.  Rights vary in their origins, historical development and scope, as well 
as in their legal status. The last of these—legal status—is linked to 
factors including availability of a viable legal forum, frameworks for 
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continuous or periodic monitoring, and other issues of enforceability. 
Where rights are not entrenched, some proponents insist there can be 
“no rights without remedies.” Others (especially in poor countries where 
many rights are difficult to implement) invoke the same, unenforceable 
rights as markers of collective intent or at least aspiration: rights in the 
future tense, directed towards better lives and future societies.
4.  In general terms, lawyers emphasise that there are many distinct, 
countable entitlements. As regards human rights it is often argued, 
though not without controversy, that in contrast these rights constitute 
a bundle of “indivisible” and “inalienable” attributes which are “uni-
versal” by virtue of the rights holder being human.
5.  People who enjoy rights (‘rights holders’—though there are also ani-
mal holders of animal rights) may be specified individuals, or all legal 
persons (including companies), or citizens in particular categories 
(e.g. rights of the child; rights of women). Or they can be “everyone,” 
as with universal human rights. Alternatively, rights holders may be 
collectivities, such as states. Or, involving difficult intersections 
between all those conceptions, rights holders may be minorities within 
a state or other jurisdiction, such as subordinated “nationalities,” eth-
nic groups or indigenous peoples. 
It is hardly surprising that, with such multidimensional variation, diffi-
cult questions surround rights in all contexts, and will inevitably arise 
when the notion is transposed into a new disciplinary field. What form 
must a right take, for example, in order to constitute a right rather than a 
value, vision, or cultural norm? How compatible are rights among them-
selves (and what must be done if they conflict with one another)? The rel-
evance of such questions is beyond doubt. A story championing a right to 
food or self-determination is likely to differ significantly—and be inter-
preted and valued differently—from a story insisting on conjugal rights or 
the right to bear arms; a narrative exploring a right to life and one explor-
ing a right to die may superficially appear parallel, yet differ fundamen-
tally as regards their underlying principle. 
III. “Rights,” the Word
My main suggestion in this article is this: that difficulties encountered 
in the conceptual history of rights are expressed, in condensed and contra-
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dictory ways, in our uses of the word rights. This largely “ordinary lan-
guage” approach of course has affinities with thinking associated with the 
Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin, including his general influence on the 
jurisprudence (and not only the work on rights) of H.L.A. Hart. It also 
connects with a very different but not incompatible approach, most inno-
vatively argued by Peter De Bolla in his The Architecture of Concepts: 
the Historical Formation of Human Rights, that the emergence of verbal 
nuance and historically differentiated concepts can be traced precisely 
through new digital humanities, essentially corpus linguistic techniques. 
If such contentions are right (in the sense now of “accurate” or “justi-
fied”), then one task in narrating rights must be to tell the story of the 
word rights itself, as carefully as possible, as an important narrative along-
side how rights are depicted in particular stories, genres or story tradi-
tions, and what an overarching historical “rights meta-narrative,” or over-
all story of the growth of rights in society, would look like. 
Most people readily acknowledge that the word right (and its plural 
rights) are not straightforward. Rather, the word shows characteristics of 
what have been called “keywords,” studied especially in a tradition pio-
neered by the British (Welsh) cultural historian Raymond Williams, who 
started to research what he called “keywords” by collecting usage of a 
cluster of five words (industry, democracy, class, art, and culture) which 
proved to be “key points” from which he could draw a map of changes in 
life and thought he was seeking to explain, but some general characteris-
tics can be indentified. Such words described as “keywords” do not form 
a fixed category, and claims made on behalf of any given candidate word 
vary. But such words (think of democracy, culture, humanity, or liberal) 
tend to be historically polysemous (they have multiple, related senses), as 
well as vague in their extension (they lead to porous category boundaries, 
of categories that have more and less prototypical members). Such words 
also tend to be contested in use (efforts to define what qualifies something 
as an exemplar of the category challenge that category’s assumed charac-
teristics); but the complex concepts such words denote nevertheless 
become prominent and influential. Partly because of nuances they convey, 
such words commonly serve as vehicles for slowly changing social think-
ing, especially on difficult topics. Making them still more difficult, 
changes in their meaning do not reflect semantic regularities in the way 
that changes in many other areas of language do. Instead, a mix of lin-
guistic and social factors is responsible for any given meaning change. 
Importantly, as a result, it can help to have a sense of the linguistic and 
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social history in mind when engaging with the word’s present difficulty 
(whereas with most vocabulary items language users find the contempo-
rary system of linguistic differences sufficient context for understanding). 
Taking these features of keywords into account—even without the more 
detailed discussion they deserve—I believe it can be helpful to consider 
the development of the English word rights as a way into assessing chal-
lenges presented by its current use and implications.
(a) Rights, Early History
Already before 1066, right was an important term in how Anglo-Saxons 
thought about the field we now conceptualize as “law.” In fact, though, 
the Anglo-Saxons were gradually moving towards calling what we 
describe as law by the Norse loanword law rather than by either right or 
the older word œ́. Among these overlapping words, right also had import-
ant ethical meanings which reflected the practices, social structures, and 
codes of behaviour of the Anglo-Saxon world.
Following the Norman Conquest, right and law increasingly coexisted 
with another word: justice (ultimately from Latin ius, with meanings center-
ing on “legal code” although other meanings accumulated in the changing 
moral and religious vocabulary of the mediaeval period). There were 
other terms, too, including equity, in a semantic field that reflected not 
only earlier cultural behaviour but conflicting social positions in what we 
might now characterize as a “colonial” political order. From the Norman 
Conquest until the late 1300s, however, the English language remained 
very much a poor relation both to Latin and French. Whereas the Anglo-
Saxon population used evolving forms of English even for their written 
law codes and other legal documents, in the post-1066 order Latin was 
the usual written language of law, and French the usual language for spo-
ken legal pleading and other legal business. Given the political situation 
of the time, it is not surprising that the French word droit also influenced 
the meaning of the English word right; and in this respect rights had 
something of an international beginning in English centuries before the 
word acquired its modern, international currency.
The semantic history of right involves successive specializations of 
meaning. Over time senses diverged, differentiating rights from equity 
and justice, even as each of those words continued to be polysemous in its 
own ways. Overall, a movement took place away from norms and privi-
leges of mediaeval feudal society in two later developments. The first was 
towards contrasts shaped by deeper understanding of classical ideas and 
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values, including as expounded in humanist philosophical thinking that 
was becoming more widely available. A second, mostly late 18th century 
development involved more fundamental reconceptualization: “rights” 
came to be viewed, as they now are as human rights, as a matter of evolv-
ing guarantees of minimum entitlement.
Even this thumbnail description brings into view a tangle of different 
meanings in right, sometimes diverging, sometimes converging, always 
overlapping. Prominent, for instance, is a broad, “moral” or “justice” mean-
ing: that which is considered proper, correct, or consonant with justice, rea-
son, or true interpretation. In earliest uses in this sense, right carried an 
implication that what is right is also honourable, wise and consistent with 
laws of Nature ordained by God, a meaning that unified a simultaneously 
social, moral and spiritual code. Notable in retrospect is that behaviour con-
sistent with right was linked not only with what in modern terms would be 
thought of as entitlement, but also with duties and social responsibilities 
(whether actually carried out or not). Throughout the period, however, 
another more specialised meaning persisted, concerned with interpersonal 
relations and transactions, especially ownership and inheritance. 
Combining different strands of significance, rights were important man-
ifestations of position or political capital: a mix of possession, authority, 
privilege and power (whether enshrined in law or presumed on moral 
grounds—or even, as with the monarch’s “divine right of kings,” pre-
sumed to be directly authorized by God). Such claims were primarily to 
have, or be capable of obtaining or in some way benefiting from some-
thing—or alternatively being able to prevent or have immunity against 
something. Note how directly this meaning contrasts with the notion of 
generally available, minimum entitlement. It is like looking at power from 
two different perspectives: a view from above and a view from below, 
both inscribed as meanings of the same word. A convincing “story of 
rights” cannot sidestep this historical reversal and continuing opposition 
between viewpoints (and such an opposition runs clearly through histori-
cal accounts of rights such as the exemplary history by Micheline Ishay).
(b) Privilege and Social Inequality
In any hierarchical social order, a tension must be mediated between an 
abstract principle of right fuelled by moral resonance and unequal social 
circumstances in which it is applied. It is such tensions that propel the 
more recent history both of the meaning of rights, and of actual, often 
violent conflicts between haves and have-nots and other opposing groups 
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in different political contexts: religious conflicts, anti-colonial struggles, 
challenges to sexual norms, efforts to seek redress for war crimes and eth-
nic cleansing, and others.
The first signs of the now globally influential, modern concept of 
rights—first as rights of man, then as human rights—are often looked for 
in challenges to political power resulting in concessions from otherwise 
presumed Royal prerogative. The English legal charter Magna Carta, 
1215, includes an undertaking by King John, in Article 40, usually trans-
lated as “to no man will we sell, to no man will we deny or delay justice 
or right.” The concessions involved in Magna Carta (i.e. a king giving in 
to the interests and demands of his disaffected barons) introduces an ele-
ment of entitlement-from-below that has been amplified, even mytholo-
gised in view of later developments that have shifted the concept of rights 
from interests and residual expectation of non-interference (so-called 
“negative liberties”) in the direction of more defined “social contract” 
freedoms and protections, to which we will turn shortly. 
At least until the 17th century, however, the emerging conception of 
rights introduced above remains entangled with simultaneously asserted 
meanings of “privilege” or “title.” Rights continued to be generally under-
stood within a system of natural rights that included presumed absolute 
sovereignty embodied in the Divine Right of Kings, albeit queried by (a 
still disputed amount of) Republican thinking that combined classical 
authority with frustrations resulting from misrule and social inequality. As 
religious (then mixed religious and secular) presumptions surrounding 
natural law receded, however, or became openly contested in political 
experience including the Civil War and execution of Charles I in 1649, 
commitment to natural rights was exposed to increased challenge. 
Marking the end of one important phase and the beginning of another, the 
history of rights in Britain took a further step through greater Parliamentary 
restriction on sovereign powers: concessionary rights granted to Parliament 
(rather than to individuals, and still hostile to minorities including Jews 
and Catholics) imposed under the 1689 Bill of Rights. 
(c) From Title to Entitlement
The tensions I have referred to above may be viewed as taking place 
between rights conferred by earlier political and religious settlement and 
rights asserted in opposition to those same presumed rights. Or, put 
another way, they concern rights reconceived as a way to promote the 
interests of classes of people excluded from previous political settle-
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ments, with a view to an emancipation that would follow, albeit ambigu-
ously as between being achieved in an actual, new social formation or 
only fully in the realm of political philosophy. Such a new direction 
(which coincides with major disruption to earlier social patterns brought 
about by an intense phase of European industrialization) must be seen, 
however, as an international trajectory, taking place not only in Britain—
and in English—but substantially elsewhere and in languages other than 
English. It resulted in shifts in philosophical and political thought during 
the late 18th century that link the idea of rights closely with political defi-
ance and social activism leading both towards American Independence 
(1776) and the French Revolution (1789). In a much later emphasis, that 
international aspect comes not only to encompass different national situa-
tions; because of the implications of universalism, it is articulated—
sometimes on behalf of others—as an ambition of all societies seeking to 
participate in a transformed global system. 
The beginnings of this reversal in the historical narrative of rights can 
first be seen, as before, in a questioning of political legitimacy as based 
on natural rights (a conception ridiculed by Jeremy Bentham in his 
Anarchical Fallacies (1791-92) as “simple nonsense: natural and impre-
scriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts”). Social think-
ing between the philosophers Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, as well as in the work of political campaigner Thomas 
Paine, shifted emphasis away from subjection to absolute sovereignty or a 
pre-given social order. First, the move was towards notions of consent 
(said, however, to be renounced in a one-off bid for protection even under 
a tyrant in Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651)); then consent given but more con-
tinuously ratified in Locke’s account in Two Treatises on Government 
(1689). Rousseau’s thinking, developed as an analysis of what is added by 
living in organised society rather than in a putative “state of nature,” con-
solidated the notion that some kind of social contract should be the basis 
of social structure. Cumulatively, shifts in these related directions paved 
the way for celebrated statements of general—sacred, human, indivisi-
ble—rights such as Thomas Jefferson’s announcement in the American 
Declaration of Independence, that [all men] “are endowed by their 
Creator with certain inalienable rights; [that] amongst these are life, liber-
ty, and the pursuit of happiness,” or Lafayette’s formulation of the 
“Déclaration des droits de l”homme et du citoyen’ (1789, assisted by 
Paine, the author of Rights of Man, 1791). In effect, some kinds of right 
became what is owed by a state to its citizens and so what that state has 
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an obligation to provide or ensure. Historically, this fundamental shift led 
for a period to a surge in “declarations” of rights: as Geoffrey Robertson 
vividly recounts, in his book Crimes against Humanity, in 1789 Thomas 
Jefferson (as American ambassador to Paris at the time of the French 
Revolution) could write home in a letter to James Madison (later the 
fourth President of the United States) that, “Everybody here is trying their 
hands at forming declarations of rights.” (p.8)
(d) The 20th Century as an “Age of Rights”
These major developments in what right can mean have largely involved 
shifts from specific towards universal and from implicit towards declared. 
Together, such shifts created conditions for emancipatory visions that have 
underpinned modern, globally influential rights-based political activism 
and initiatives. Struggles based wholly or in part on such reconceptualiza-
tion are nevertheless still confronted by the other kinds of rights, presumed 
(often legally held) by specific other people, by institutions and by nation 
states; and conflicts between different conceptions have been an almost 
continuous feature of political struggles, through anti-slavery campaigns 
and the U.S. Civil War, the Suffragette movement and U.S. Civil Rights 
movements campaigning for political representation, anti-colonial and 
other revolutionary movements based on a right to self-determination, and 
modern feminist and anti-discrimination campaigns on many fronts.
Undoubtedly, however, the main period of political expression and legal 
adoption of rights within this political, legal and cultural transformation, 
following tentative steps after World War I, was the period immediately 
after World War II, when international initiatives were considered urgent 
because of the recent trauma of Nazi genocide and fear of an anticipated 
spread of communism. Emerging from that mixed legacy and political 
prospect, since the 1950s much of the modern terminology and broad 
conception of rights has been embedded in international law. Two 
Covenants of 1966 (ratified a decade later) are now considered to have 
created, along with the earlier Universal Declaration, an International Bill 
of Rights. These landmarks, and other later, in many cases regional rights 
instruments have developed rights thinking into the many categories 
alluded to at the beginning of this essay. 
Over the last 60 years, as a result—including through the major transi-
tion from Cold War into far-reaching liberal globalisation—we can say 
there is an international human rights movement consisting of bodies rang-
ing from supranational organisations through to NGOs and one-issue cam-
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paign groups. This international movement of ideas and organisations has 
propounded ways of thinking which strengthen particular meanings of 
right outlined above, while exacerbating clashes between different actors 
and interests including those associated with private transnational bodies, 
state institutions, and embattled, often dispossessed or migrant populations. 
Across an increased range of domains, efforts are made to insist on base-
line entitlements available to all that can either be implemented immediate-
ly (by national legislation, reflecting international commitment) or drawn 
on later, as recognised universal values rather than positive, specified 
rights, in a process of “progressive realisation” when political opportunity 
and resources permit. In such circumstances, we are often said to live in an 
age of rights, though different views are expressed on whether we are at 
the beginning of that age or somewhere later in its historical lifetime.
IV. Rights Discourse 
My general point so far has been that the history of the meanings of 
rights is an important component of any “rights narrative.” Our ability to 
“narrate rights,” in the sense of depicting their realization, triumphs or 
obstruction, depends on clarity but also on acknowledgement of complexi-
ty in naming, defining, contextualizing and evaluating the different sorts 
of rights in question (for accessible accounts, see Michael Freeman’s con-
cise textbook; Mark Goodale’s collection of essays on human rights and 
anthropology; the volume on minority rights edited by Will Kymlicka; or, 
on the relation between different kinds of rights—between human rights 
and intellectual property rights in this case—the detailed legal analysis by 
Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin). Yet despite the existence of many 
such scholarly works my description suggests we don’t have—or don’t yet 
have—a settled or consistent general vocabulary for discussing rights, and 
have to make constant reference to historically varied, legally complex, in 
many cases translated, and sometimes contradictory specialized sources. 
Perhaps that is to be expected. But beyond the legal and political sourc-
es themselves, (many made easily accessible by having been brought 
together in extract form in Micheline Ishays’s Human Right Reader), the 
core term rights is everywhere in general use, sliding with ease across a 
complex taxonomy of politically varying, potentially incompatible reali-
ties, presumptions, beliefs and hopes. In some contexts, the term right is 
linked to a particular domain or rights-holder, by being preceded by a 
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modifier: women’s rights, civil rights, fishing rights, equal rights, repro-
ductive rights, mining rights, patient rights, prisoners’ rights, and intel-
lectual property rights (such as film rights or copyright). Other uses—
showing similar tensions—designate an object or aim, but without only 
implicit indication of a right holder or the scope with which the right can 
be exercised: right to life, right to die, right to work, right to strike, right 
to enter, right to remain, right to choose, right to vote, right to develop-
ment, right to buy, right to silence, as well as (used in relation to past con-
flicts and atrocities) the right to truth. 
At stake in such uses is considerable variation, and some uncertainty, 
regarding whether the rights referred to already exist (at treaty or conven-
tion level, or adopted in some other human rights instrument, or as part of 
national law); whether they are imminent, somewhere in the process of 
progressive realisation; whether they are presumptions based on moral val-
ues, custom, or a personal sense of justice; or whether, sometimes, they 
remain only a figure of speech. For many, an act of declaration of rights—
even allowing for difficulties surrounding authority to perform, and so the 
legitimacy of, such acts of declaring—is felt as sending a powerful, sym-
bolic message. Among disenfranchised people, “arguments from rights” 
understandably appear the best or only way of “trumping” (to echo a term 
used by Ronald Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously) the asymmetries 
embedded in earlier regimes of law and power. For others, many rights 
remain problematic, even hopelessly idealistic, because they are felt to cir-
culate in a zone mixing law, morality, activist rhetoric and unqualified 
assertion. For them, some rights promise levels of entitlement beyond what 
any social order could deliver; and, through lack of what is considered real-
ism, some rights thinking is thought potentially to lead to current, enforce-
able legal rights being taken less seriously, even ridiculed. Resulting confu-
sions present themselves as widespread simplification and exaggeration, as 
well as sometimes as an insistence—ironically, given the long history of 
struggle—that universally available rights may distort the necessary, even 
customary balance that needs to exist between rights and responsibilities. 
V. Conclusion: Rights and Narrative
Familiarity with the history of the word rights, I have suggested, can 
help in understanding the diffusion of ideas about and attitudes towards 
rights in cultural discourse. To understand the particular challenges pre-
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sented by the “rights as narrative” metaphor with which this essay began, 
however, something more is called for: discussion of how and why stories 
about rights are told. It is not possible to explicate the phrase “narrating 
rights” fully; but it may nevertheless be possible to pose suitable ques-
tions in a way that can expose the kinds of difficulty that humanities 
scholars working in this field are likely to face. 
We might first note that narrative is a contemporary keyword analo-
gous in this respect to rights (consider how far the idiom “change the nar-
rative” has spread beyond the meaning of fictional “story” into public 
affairs and politics, meaning something resembling “accepted framing of 
events”). The significance of “narrating rights,” accordingly, may be clar-
ified by unpacking the history of narrative along lines adopted above for 
rights. Without going into equivalent detail (a full entry can be found in a 
forthcoming keyword collection edited by Colin MacCabe and Holly 
Yanacek), the relevant point is that, like rights, the meaning of the word 
narrative undergoes at least one major reversal in its history. In its first 
uses in English during the 16th century, narrative meant a legal exposition 
of facts: a setting out of particulars claimed and expected to be true. Over 
subsequent centuries, the dominant meaning of narrative related to plots 
in fiction, including more recently—influenced by the literary field of 
narratology—how such plots can be told in different ways, for example 
by foregrounding different or multiple points of view, or by incorporating 
techniques such as flashbacks and parallel cutting of multiple storylines 
in cinema. In recent decades, further influenced by cultural theory, the 
important reversal occurred: the sense related to fictional storytelling 
began to be applied back onto events in the world, treating those events as 
if they not only can be represented as stories but in some sense are sto-
ries. Even long-term historical developments (such as “social progress”) 
could in this context be viewed as narratives created by thinking during 
the Enlightenment period: so-called “grand narratives,” to be celebrated 
in the case of “social progress” as an ongoing, heroic quest or treated with 
scepticism in the way a fictional narrative might be. In current use, these 
different meanings increasingly overlap, especially in fields such as polit-
ical communications and public relations, where situations and events are 
viewed as raw material that lends itself to being “narrated” in alternative 
forms. Those forms are sometimes so elastic that the communicator is lib-
erated from any strict notion of truth in framing situations and events by 
an implication in the word narrative that there may not be any fixed sub-
stance underneath the level of narrative itself. 
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As regards the category we have been assuming, of some general kind 
of “rights narrative,” several lines of questioning radiate outwards from 
such meanings of “narrating” and the issues of story and reality they 
raise. One practical query concerns what the characteristics of a “rights 
narrative” are. A second question involves the different ways such narra-
tives might be read, for instance in relation to the interpretive criteria of 
“authenticity” and “convention.” A third question concerns how far, cumu-
latively, representations of rights build a meta-narrative that may be sug-
gestive in showing how we understand social history and future directions.
Looking for general textual characteristics tends towards over-generali-
sation; but doing so may still be useful in clarifying what forms of “narra-
tion” are possible in relation to “rights.” To be a “rights narrative,” for 
example, must narration include some presentation of activism (e.g. cam-
paigning to establish or defend rights) rather than purely an account of 
human suffering or deprivation? Or is it enough that a “rights narrative,” 
in the minimal sense of a book or film concerned with rights, achieves its 
effect purely by portraying suffering caused by what Hannah Arendt elo-
quently described, in “The Decline of the Nation State and the End of the 
Rights of Man,” as “the barbed-wire labyrinth into which people(s) are 
driven” (The Origins of Totalitarianism 295)? Such a question is partly a 
matter of whether there is a category (in effect, a “genre”) of “rights sto-
ries,” if examples are all considered together, and if so what common 
characteristics or family resemblances bring them together (especially 
characteristics that might differentiate a “rights narrative” from a disaster 
story, tragedy, or other forms representing human suffering). At the same 
time, reflecting the principle that genres are not only a matter of formal 
properties but are also differentiated by their intended effects, the ques-
tion concerns what effect is anticipated on a reader or viewer. A focus on 
rights advocacy, for example, will highlight either the rule of law or alter-
natively difficulties in investigating or overcoming rights violations—but 
it will presumably always entertains the possibility of social change. 
Without polemic or struggle against injustice, focus primarily on suffering 
(which may still testify powerfully to a need for rights) highlights differ-
ent characteristics, such as people’s dignity, endurance and common 
humanity even in suffering. It need not involve a commitment to improve-
ment in external social conditions; such a narrative would be likely to 
evoke responses combining sympathy, empathy, and anger felt on behalf 
of victims or survivors—but with only implied encouragement towards 
rather than illustration of the kinds of mobilisation towards change associ-
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ated with rights defenders. In any particular text, the two alternatives are 
unlikely to be polarised. Rather, a blend of the two is likely to guide audi-
ence reaction—a blend, however, that—as we saw with the Barthélémy 
Toguo montage of the Universal Declaration and human suffering with 
which this essay began—can remain enigmatic or unresolved.
Extending the question whether “rights narratives” are only individually 
expressive or whether together they constitute a literary or political “genre,” 
it seems worth pursuing further how representations of rights might fit into 
a larger classification of narratives. Such representations (on a definition 
that includes survivor or witness testimony, memoirs, and documentaries) 
are often assumed to be “personal narratives,” and to “document” experi-
ences and events either factually, or obliquely by means of reconstruction 
or dramatization. But other works that might also be described as “rights 
narratives” are by no means all autobiographical, reportage, or factual his-
tory; and those other idioms have also proved themselves well suited to 
exploring social problems, alternatives, and aspirations. Such forms 
include utopian and dystopian fantasy, journey narratives, satirical critique 
and parody, allegorical discussion, and tragic, heroic, visionary, or sci-
ence-fiction forms. These more literary treatments of rights call for 
responses that are likely to be more complex—without necessarily being 
any stronger or worthwhile—than those triggered by rights violation “case 
studies” and documentary; more literary expectations and interpretive 
strategies embed reported or fictional experience in wider notions of cre-
ativity from which “rights narratives” may be only be separated artificially.
Queries along these lines could be explored, and responses to them test-
ed, by reference to many literary works, films and discourse of other 
kinds. The underlying point, however, is a general one: that stories of all 
kinds are not only reports of the world as it is, but also purposeful, rhetor-
ical contributions to an ongoing social dialogue. In narratives concerned 
with rights, a particular emotive and persuasive capability is to disturb 
readers’ or viewers’ complacency with the world as it is, to motivate and 
inspire, and to encourage identification and solidarity with the experience 
of others. But at the same time all texts draw on conventions. Given the 
saturation of contemporary life with narrative, and the development 
among most populations of considerable levels of narrative literacy, even 
narratives concerned with suffering and injustice will be interpreted partly 
in relation to narrative conventions, including the many different ways of 
narrating a plot, as well as in relation to the experiences or events which 
may have prompted narration in the first place. 
638	 Alan Durant
Issues of the kind I am raising about narrative here are important as 
regards what “narrating rights” might be thought capable of achieving, 
and also what compromises and risks surround such a a sensitive form of 
expression. It seems a fair assumption, for example, that a rights narrative 
will to some extent be partisan, either in celebrating historical progress 
towards the realisation of rights in the legal or political sphere, or alterna-
tively in drawing attention to obstacles standing in the way of progress 
towards that end. It is difficult to conceive of a text described as a “rights 
narrative” that would not reflect commitment in this way. Yet such an 
engaged stance in storytelling, unless suitably nuanced, can potentially 
lead to a perception of rights narratives promoting (depicting the world as 
it might be) more than describing or reflecting the world as it is, not in the 
details of the narrative but in overall purpose. In such circumstances, 
“rights narrative” might appear a kind of liberal equivalent to the largely 
discredited aesthetic of socialist realism. There is an obvious, fundamen-
tal difference: that, rather than working to vindicate principles of state 
socialism, “rights stories” support very different, rights-based political 
aspirations. But such a difference is more one of content than of narration. 
While it can seem shocking to suggest such a comparison (despite the 
continuing pertinence of Marx’s own early critique of human rights), such 
a risk must exist as part of efforts to articulate rights in the form of narra-
tives; and any resulting similarity could not be viewed as purely one of 
narrative genre (e.g. that the hero prevails or always gets the girl) because 
it is more closely connected with purpose and ideology: a “grand narra-
tive” of civil progress through human rights, put to work in shaping not 
explicit analysis and argument but aesthetic vision. Rights, in the senses 
of human rights described above (though not in other senses), are insepa-
rable from a teleological narrative of law and morality. So a “rights narra-
tive,” if by that we mean an illustration or story of social development 
taking place through struggles over rights, will always risk to some 
degree appearing a selective account imposed on greater complexity of 
political experience and history. To this it might be countered that need be 
no tension between conviction and creativity, and that the “grand narra-
tive” of rights is as good a narrative as we have. Such a narrative, howev-
er—and kinds of narration that replenish and extend it—will be as good 
as the points of principle and forms of analysis that underpin it, not only 
in the narration itself. Such narration, and the kinds of commentary and 
criticism brought to bear, can be strengthened by disentangling the chang-
ing and different meanings of rights, and attending to the specificity and 
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status of the rights that we have or need. In the absence of such attention, 
risks associated with possible promotional purpose and relativism to 
which narrative is subject will creep back in, especially if “narrating 
rights” is woven into a triumphalist version of economic liberalism and 
the politics of globalisation—either of which could alternatively be 
viewed as putting obstacles in the way of realising human rights.
Middlesex University London
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Abstract
Humanities scholars have recently begun to use the phrase “narrating 
rights” as a way of describing an increasingly discussed area of intersec-
tion between legal, ethical, and literary topics. This article examines the 
conceptual basis and directions of that emergent area of work. It outlines 
features of “rights” as generally understood in law, along with relevant 
associated issues; it explains how, in the complex history of the English 
word rights, that word has conveyed different, often contested notions 
which persist into contemporary thinking; and it concludes with com-
ments and queries regarding the challenges which face studies in human-
ities in using “narrative” as a way into understanding rights. In develop-
ing its arguments, the article highlights the interconnectedness of linguis-
tic, literary and legal aspects of political and cultural topics, and encour-
ages further interdisciplinary work.
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